We study a classical Bayesian mechanism design problem where a seller is selling multiple items to a buyer. We consider the case where the seller has costs to produce the items, and these costs are private information to the seller. How can the seller design a mechanism to maximize her profit? Two well-studied problems, revenue maximization in multi-item auctions and signaling in ad auctions, are special cases of our problem. We show that there exists a simple mechanism whose profit is at least 1 11 the optimal profit, when the buyer has a constraint-additive valuation over independent items. The approximation factor becomes 6 when the buyer is additive. Our result holds even when the seller's costs are correlated across items.
INTRODUCTION
We study the profit maximization problem for selling multiple items to a buyer. Unlike most works in Mechanism Design, we consider the case where the seller has costs for obtaining the items. As these costs usually depend on private information that is only available to the seller, we assume that the costs are private to the seller but are drawn from a distribution also known to the buyer. The goal is to design a mechanism that maximizes the profit, that is, the total revenue less the total cost. Revenue maximization in multi-item auctions, one of the most classical and widely studied problem in Bayesian Mechanism Design [2, 6, 8, 10, 11, 16, 17, 23, 25, 27] , is a special case of our problem, where the seller always has cost 0 for each item. Arguably, it is more natural and general to assume that there is a cost associated with each item. It may be production cost or opportunity cost, e.g., there is an outside option to sell the item at a certain price.
Despite being realistic and widely applicable, the profit maximization problem is not wellunderstood. To the best of our knowledge, the only case with non-zero costs that has been studied is in the context of ad auctions [4, 18, 19, 21, 22] . The problem models the following scenario. The auctioneer is selling an ad displaying slot to an advertiser. There are n types of viewers of the webpage. The advertiser has value t i for displaying his ad to a type i viewer. In an ad auction, only the auctioneer observes the type of the viewer, and the advertiser only knows a prior distribution π from which the viewer-type is drawn from. What mechanism maximizes the auctioneer's revenue? We can easily cast this problem as a profit maximization problem. Let there be n items. When the viewer has type i, assign item i with cost 0 and all the other items with cost ∞. Clearly, maximizing revenue in the ad auction is equivalent to maximizing profit in the corresponding multi-item setting, as the seller will never sell any item with ∞ cost. Many results are known for this special case, which we will discuss in Section 1.4.
In revenue maximization, the optimal mechanism is known to be randomized and complex in multi-item settings. Instead of characterizing the optimal mechanisms, a major and successful research theme in Mechanism Design is devoted to designing simple and approximately optimal mechanisms [2, 7-11, 13, 25-27, 29] . As our problem generalizes the multi-item revenue maximization problem, it is clear that the profit-optimal mechanism also requires complex allocation rules and randomization. In this paper, we focus on designing simple and approximately optimal mechanisms for profit maximization.
To facilitate the discussion, we will first explain our model. There are n items for sale, and the seller has cost c i for parting with item i. The costs (c 1 , . . . , c n ) are drawn from a distribution C that is known to both the seller and the buyer. We allow the seller's costs to be correlated across items. Consider constrained-additive buyers, that is, the buyer has a downward-closed feasibility constraint F ⊆ 2 [n] that specifies what bundles of items are allowed. The buyer has value t i for item i, and her value for a bundle S is defined as max A∈ F,A⊆S i ∈A t i . Similar to most results in the simple vs. optimal literature, we assume t i to be drawn from D i independently across items.
Before we state our results, let us examine two natural but unsuccessful attempts to solve this problem.
Two unsuccessful attempts: (i) Use a mechanism that (approximately) optimizes the revenue. This is a terrible solution as some of the items sold by the mechanism may have extremely high costs, and as a result the mechanism only generates low if any profit. (ii) After the seller sees the costs, reveal them to the buyer, then use the optimal or approximately optimal mechanism that is tailored to those particular costs. The reason why this mechanism may be far away from optimal is much more subtle. Let us consider the following example in the ad auction setting adapted from examples in [18] x . Let D i be the ER distribution for each item i. Define δ i to be the n-dimensional vector whose i-th entry is 0 and all the other entries are ∞. Let the costs (c 1 , . . . , c n ) = δ i have probability 1/n for each i.
The expected profit of the mechanism in (ii)
Since for every i, after revealing cost δ i , the seller can only sell item i to the buyer.
Consider an alternative mechanism which does not reveal the costs, but offers the buyer the following contract: if the buyer pays log n/2 up front, the buyer can take any item that is available, e.g. has cost 0. The chance that the buyer accepts the contract is
and due to a Lemma by [25] , we know that it is at least 1/2. Hence, the mechanism has profit at least log n 4 . Note that in the second mechanism of our example, the seller does not even reveal any information to the buyer and extracts much higher profit.
The two failed attempts highlight two major challenges of our problem: (i) how to balance the revenue and cost; (ii) how to capture the informational rent of the buyer, that is, leveraging the fact that the costs are private information to extract more revenue. We overcome these two challenges by considering what we called permit-selling mechanisms. These mechanisms have two stages. For each item i, we create a separate permit that allows the buyer to purchase the item at its cost. In the first stage, we sell the permits without revealing any information about the actual costs. In the second stage, the seller reveals all the costs, and the buyer can buy item i by only paying the cost c i if the buyer has purchased the permit for item i in the first stage. How does the buyer make a decision in such a mechanism? In the first stage, the buyer needs to choose her favorite bundle of permits to purchase. Since she knows the distribution C, she can compute her utility for each bundle of permits. In the second stage, the buyer simply picks her favorite set of items based on the permits she own, the costs of the items, and her valuation function. Why do the permit-selling mechanisms help addressing the two challenges? Note that the profit of the permit-selling mechanisms is exactly the revenue from the first stage, so any mechanism that achieves high revenue in the first stage also generates high profit. Moreover, the buyer needs to make a decision on what permits to purchase without learning the costs, therefore, the seller can extract the informational rent by pricing the permits appropriately.
Indeed, we do not even need to use any complex pricing scheme in the first stage. We sell the permits separately or sell them as a grand bundle. In our proof we need one more mechanism, which simply sells the items separately, and the prices change according to the seller's costs. The reason why this class of mechanism is required is more subtle and we only sketch the intuition here. In the permit-selling mechanism, for a fixed buyer type profile t, the buyer purchases a set of permits P and thus the seller can only extract revenue from items in P, no matter what realized costs she has. However, for different cost vectors, the seller may have different items from which she can extract more revenue. By posting item prices that depend on her cost, the seller is able to target the profitable items based on her realized cost vector. This approach does not capture the informational rent but may generate high profit in certain cases.
Here are the mechanisms we use.
• sell-items-separately (IS): for each possible cost vector c = (c 1 , · · · , c n ), sell the items separately, and the price p i (c) for item i depends on c. • sell-permits-separately (PS): sell the permits separately, and the price p i for the i-th permit is independent from the seller's costs. • permit-bundling (PB): sell all the permits as a grand bundle at a price p that is independent from the seller's costs. Since in all these mechanisms, the seller does not even ask the buyer to report her valuation, the mechanism is clear incentive compatible (IC) and individually rational (IR). We show that the best mechanism among these three classes of mechanisms can already achieve a constant fraction of the optimal profit. Theorem 1.2. For any valuation distribution D = D 1 × . . . × D n , cost distribution C, and any downward-closed feasibility constraint F , the best mechanism among all sell-items-separately, sellpermits-separately, and permit-bundling mechanisms is an 11-approximation to the optimal profit.
When the buyer's valuation is additive, we can improve the approximation factor to 6. Theorem 1.3. If the buyer has additive valuation, for any valuation distribution D = D 1 × . . . × D n and cost distribution C, the best mechanism among all sell-items-separately, sell-permits-separately, and permit-bundling mechanisms is a 6-approximation to the optimal profit.
Proof Sketch and Techniques
Since the costs are private, it is a priori not clear that it is sufficient to consider only direct mechanisms. Indeed, signaling mechanisms, a class of indirect mechanisms, are widely studied in the ad auction setting [4, 18, 19, 21, 22] . We first prove a revelation principle for our problem similar to the one proved in [18] for ad auctions. Our revelation principle states that w.l.o.g. we can restrict our attention to direct, IC, and IR mechanisms. Moreover, we can formulate the profit maximization problem as an LP. We next apply the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg duality framework [7] . The framework has become a standard tool for analyzing the performance of simple mechanisms. In most of the results based on this duality approach, a particular family of dual variables, called the "canonical dual" [7, 9] , is used to provide a benchmark for the objective function. However, this set of dual variables does not provide an appropriate benchmark due to the existence of costs. We propose a new set of dual variables that is tailored to handle the costs. Indeed, these dual variables are so informative that they inspired us to introduce the permit-selling mechanisms.
The benchmark induced by our dual variables can be easily decomposed into two components -Most-Surplus and Less-Surplus. Most-Surplus can be bounded by the profit of the sell-itemsseparately mechanism using relatively standard analysis. For Less-Surplus, instead of directly analyzing the term, we construct an auxiliary revenue maximization problem for selling n items to help approximate Less-Surplus. Intuitively, each item in the auxiliary problem corresponds to a permit. We first show that any mechanism in the auxiliary problem can be turned into a permitselling mechanism in the original problem, such that the revenue in the auxiliary problem is the same as the profit of the permit-selling mechanism. Next, we argue that the buyer has subadditive valuation in the auxiliary problem whenever the buyer has constrained additive valuation in the original problem. Note that the better of selling the items separately and grand bundling is a constant factor approximation of the optimal revenue when the buyer has subadditive valuation [9, 27] . Unfortunately, we cannot use this approximation as a black-box, as it is not yet clear how the EC'19 Session 2c: Mechanism Design I revenue in the auxiliary problem relates to the Less-Surplus term. Luckily, Cai and Zhao obtain their result via the CDW duality framework, and in their analysis, they show that a term identical to Less-Surplus can be approximated by the revenue of selling the items separately or grand bundling. Putting everything together, we prove that the profit of a sell-permits-separately or permit-bundling mechanism approximates Less-Surplus, and that completes our proof.
Our Contributions
Our main contributions in this paper are the followings:
• We introduce the permit-selling mechanisms and demonstrate their ability to approximate the optimal profit. • We construct a new set of dual variables that can accommodate costs.
• We establish a connection between profit maximization and revenue maximization with subadditive bidders.
Our Model vs. Two-sided Markets
There has been increasing interest in two-sided markets in the Economics and Computation community recently [1, 3, 5, 14, 15, 20] . In a two-sided market, the mechanism should be designed to incentivize both buyers and sellers to reveal their true private information. Our model is related to the two-sided markets but differs in the following crucial way, that is, we assume that the seller has committing power: the seller commits to a mechanism and follows the mechanism honestly. In other words, the mechanism does not need to satisfy the seller's Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraint in our model. This is a standard assumption used in both mechanism design for one-sided markets where the seller is also the designer of the mechanism, as well as in information design where the designer commits to a certain information structure. For example, in ad auctions, the seller receives a piece of private information, the type of the item, and sends a signal to the buyer based on this private information using a pre-committed signaling scheme. The model assumes that the seller follows the signaling scheme honestly and does not impose any IC constraints on the seller.
Related Work
There is a large body of beautiful work on simple vs. optimal for revenue maximization in multi-item auctions [2, 7-13, 24, 26, 27, 29] . They showed that simple mechanisms can extract a constant fraction of the optimal revenue in rich settings. If there is a single buyer, the state-of-the-art results [9, 27] apply to subadditive valuation functions; if there are multiple buyers, the state-ofthe-art result [9] applies to XOS valuation functions. However, none of these results considered costs.
The ad auction problem has also been extensively studied in the literature [4, 18, 19, 21, 22] . Signaling mechanisms had been the focus. In a signaling mechanism, the seller first sends a signal to the buyer based on the type of the viewer and according to a signaling scheme known to the buyer. The buyer updates her posterior belief of the viewer type after observing the signal. The seller then uses a mechanism tailored to the buyer's updated posterior to sell the ad displaying slot. Many results have been obtained regarding the revenue-optimal signaling scheme. Overall, the optimal signaling scheme may be highly complex and hard to pin down. Interestingly, Daskalakis et al. showed that even if we can find the optimal signaling scheme the corresponding mechanism can still be bounded away from the optimum [18] . They showed that the optimal mechanism is direct and does not involve any signaling. Motivated by their result, we focus on simple and direct mechanisms.
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In [18] , they also showed how to use simple mechanisms to approximate the auctioneer's profit in an ad auction. They established the result by reducing the problem to revenue maximization in multi-item auctions with an additive buyer. However, their reduction is ad-hoc and heavily relies on a specific property of their cost distribution, that is, the cost is always one of the δ i s (see Example 1.1 for the definition). When the cost distribution is general, their reduction no longer holds, and thus is inapplicable to our problem.
PRELIMINARIES
We consider the auction where a seller is selling n heterogeneous items to a single buyer. The buyer
the type for the buyer. The buyer has a constraint-additive valuation, which implies that she is additive over the items but is only allowed to receive a set of items that is feasible with respect to a downward-closed family F ⊆ 2 [n] . In other words, the buyer with type t has value v(t, S) = max T ⊆S,T ∈ F j ∈T t i when receiving set S. On the other hand, the seller has a private cost c i for producing each item i. Denote c the cost vector and c is drawn from some distribution C. Let T S be the support of C. We allow correlated costs in our problem.
For any direct 2 mechanism M and any t, c, denote x i (t, c) the probability that the buyer is receiving item i, when buyer has type t and seller has cost c. Similarly, use p(t, c) to denote the payment for the buyer. For any t and c, the buyer's utility
. We now define the incentive compatibility and individual rationality for our setting:
• If the mechanism allocates set S to the buyer, and the buyer is only interested in a feasible subset of items U ⊂ S, the mechanism can simply allocate set U . This does not affect the truthfulness for the buyer and increases the seller's profit. In this paper, we will only consider mechanisms that always allocate a feasible set of items U ∈ F . Denote P(F ) the region for all feasible allocations x.
For every mechanism M, denote Profit(D, C, F , M) the seller's expected profit in M. We use Profit(M) for short when (D, C, F ) is clear and fixed.
As we will explain in Lemma 4.2, it is w.l.o.g. to only consider direct, IC, and IR mechanisms. Let OPT Profit (D, C, F ) be the optimal profit among all IC and IR mechanisms (use OPT Profit for short when (D, C, F ) is clear and fixed). Our goal is to use a simple mechanism to approximate OPT Profit (D, C, F ).
Our Mechanisms
We bound the optimal profit by the following three classes of mechanisms. The first mechanism is sell-items-separately (IS) mechanism. The mechanism is similar to the posted price mechanism in the revenue maximization problem, except that the seller may decide the posted price according to her cost vector. Before the auction starts, the seller will decide a posted price p i (c) for each i based on her cost vector c. Then the posted prices are revealed to the buyer and she will choose her favorite bundle and pay the posted prices. Clearly the mechanism is ex-post IC and ex-post IR. We use IS-Profit to denote the optimal seller's profit among all sell-items-separately mechanisms.
Next, we define the two permit-selling mechanisms that we need. We first need the following definition.
This is the expected surplus of the buyer given a set of permits P in the second stage of a permit-selling mechanism. In the first stage of the permit-selling mechanism, the buyer is required to find her favorite set of permits by calculatingv(t, P) for all P, which is computationally hard. However, we show that as long as the buyer can make the right decision in scenarios where she can only derive positive utility from a single permit, our mechanism is already a constant factor approximation to the optimal profit. See Footnote 3 for more details.
The second class of mechanism is called sell-permits-separately (PS). There are two stages in the mechanism. In the first stage, instead of selling the items, the seller sells a permit for each item. She decides a price p i for permit i independent from the seller's cost vector c. The buyer is allowed to purchase any permit i by paying p i . In the second stage, the seller reveals her cost vector c to the buyer, and the buyer can purchase any item i at a price of c i if the buyer has permit i. The buyer is not allowed to purchase item i if she does not have the corresponding permit. The buyer chooses her favorite bundle among the items that she is allowed to purchase. Notice that in the second stage, the buyer with set of permits P ⊆ [n] will choose the bundle S * = argmax S ⊆P,S ∈ F i ∈S (t i − c i ). Thus, in the first stage, by knowing her valuation t, all the permit prices p j s, as well as the cost distribution C, the buyer is able to calculate her expected surplus in the second stagev(t, P)(see Definition 2.1) for any P ⊆ [n]. She will hence choose the best set P * that maximizes her expected utility in the whole auction and buy all the permits in set P * 3 . Thus the mechanism is IC and IR. See Mechanism 1 for details.
Mechanism 1 Sell-permits-separately
Require: p i , the price for permit i, for all i ∈ [n].
1: Show all the permit prices to the buyer. 2: The buyer chooses a set of permits P * = argmax P ⊆[n]v (t, P) and pays i ∈P * p i . 3: Reveal c to the buyer. 4: The buyer chooses a set of items S * = argmax S ⊆P * ,S ∈ F i ∈S (t i − c i ) and pays i ∈S * c i . 3 The readers may wonder how can the buyer find the best set P * . To explain this, we consider any type profile t where there exists i such thatv(t, {i }) > p i andv(t, {k }) < p k , ∀k i. In this scenario buying the permit i only is the unique way to derive positive utility (v is subadditive by Lemma 5.5) and the buyer will buy permit i for sure. We point out that only counting the profit from these types suffices to to bound Most-Surplus. Please see footnote 8 for more details. Thus, our result holds even if the buyer cannot find the best set in all scenarios. As long as she can make the right decision in the above scenarios, enough profit is generated by our mechanism.
Here is a quick remark: the sell-items-separately mechanism may look similar to the sell-permitsseparately mechanism. However, there is a major difference between the two mechanisms. In the IS mechanism, by posting a item price that depends on her cost vector, the seller is revealing information about her costs (the private information) to the buyer before the buyer makes any decision. That's why the mechanism is ex-post truthful. While in the PS mechanism, the buyer has no information about the costs in the first stage, and the mechanism is only truthful in expectation over the seller's costs. We use PS-Profit to denote the optimal profit among all PS mechanisms.
The third mechanism is permit-bundling (PB). The seller bundles all permits together and sell them as a grand bundle in the first stage. The seller decides a price p for the permit bundle independent from c. The buyer refuses to pay p, then she get no permit and therefore cannot purchase anything in the second stage. If the buyer buys the permit bundle, the seller reveals her cost vector c to the buyer and asks for an item price c i for item i. The buyer then chooses her favorite bundle and pays the item prices. The mechanism is also IC and IR due to a similar argument as for the PS mechanisms. We use PB-Profit to denote the optimal profit for the PB mechanisms. See Mechanism 2 for details.
Mechanism 2 Permit-bundling
Require: p, the price for the grand permit-bundle 1: Show p to the buyer. 2: if The buyer pays p then 3:
Reveal c to the buyer.
4:
The buyer chooses a set of items S * = argmax S ⊆[n],S ∈ F i ∈S (t i − c i ) and pays i ∈S * c i . 5: else 6: The buyer pays nothing and receives nothing. 7: end if
PAPER ORGANIZATION
In this section, we provide a roadmap for our paper (see Figure 1 ). In Section 4, we introduce a benchmark of the optimal profit using the CDW duality framework. We formulate the maximization problem as an LP, take the Lagrangian dual (Section 4.1), and then define a new set of dual variables (a flow) to derive our benchmark (Section 4.2).
In Section 5, we divide the benchmark into two terms -Most-Surplus and Less-Surplus -and bound them separately. For Most-Surplus, we bound it using the sell-items-separately mechanism (Section 5.1). For Less-Surplus, we first construct an auxiliary revenue maximization problem for selling n items(called the revenue setting). We show that any mechanism in the auxiliary problem can be turned into a permit-selling mechanism in the original problem without changing the value of the objective (Lemma 5.3). Then we point out that in the benchmark of the optimal revenue in the auxiliary problem, one term is identical to Less-Surplus and can be approximated by the revenue of selling the items separately or grand bundling. Thus by converting the two mechanisms to the permit-selling mechanisms, we can bound Less-Surplus using the PS and PB mechanisms.
In Section 6, we briefly discuss how to compute our simple mechanisms.
BENCHMARK FOR THE MAXIMUM PROFIT
In this section, we construct a benchmark for the optimal profit using the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg duality framework. We need the following notations. For
only depends on t i 4 , so we also usev i (t i ) to denotev(t, {i}). 
Here, for every i, R i = {t ∈ T |v i (t i ) ≥v k (t k ), ∀k i}.φ i (·) is the Myerson's ironed virtual value function for D i .
Before getting into the proof of Theorem 4.1, we first point out that the revelation principle holds in the profit maximization problem. Therefore, it suffices to find a benchmark for the optimal profit attainable by any direct, IC, and IR mechanisms. Lemma 4.2. Any ex-post implementable mechanism in the profit maximization problem can be implemented by a direct, IC, and IR mechanism.
Proof. Consider a mechanism M that is ex-post implementable. For every t, let A(t) be the buyer's (possibly randomized) equilibrium strategy, when her type is t. It specifies all the actions that the buyer takes in mechanism M. For every c, let X (A, c) be the vector of (possibly randomized) indicator variables that indicate whether the buyer gets each item i when she chooses strategy A and the seller's realized cost vector is c; let P(A, c) be the payment for the buyer.
Since A(·) is the equilibrium strategy for the buyer, for every t, t ′ ∈ T , acting as A(t) induces more utility than A(t ′ ), when the buyer's type is t. We have
We now define the direct mechanism M ′ = (x, p) as follows: for every profile (t, c), let x(t, c) = X (A(t), c) and p(t, c) = P(A(t ′ ), c). It's the allocation and payment rule when the buyer reports type t and the seller's realized cost vector is c. Then Inequality (1) is equivalent to: for every t, t ′ ∈ T
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It's exactly the IC constraint for M ′ . Thus, M ′ is IC. Moreover, the buyer can choose not to participate in
Duality Framework
The framework is first developed in [7] and is widely used in mechanism design. Here we apply the framework to our profit maximization problem. We obtain an upper bound of the optimal profit similar to the upper bound of the optimal revenue obtained in [7] . More specifically, the profit of any IC, IR mechanism is upper bounded by the buyer's virtual welfare minus the seller's total cost for the same allocation, with respect to some virtual value function. We will only show a sketch of the framework in the main body and refer the readers to Appendix A for a complete description.
In the framework, we first formulate the profit maximization problem as an LP. Then take the partial Lagrangian dual of the LP by lagrangifying the IC and IR constraints. Since the buyer's payment is unconstrained in the partial Lagrangian, one can argue that to obtain any finite benchmark, the corresponding dual variables must form a flow. The virtual value function in the benchmark is then defined according to the choice of the dual variables/flow. Lemma 4.3. For any dual solution λ that induces a finite benchmark of the optimal profit and any IC, IR mechanism M = (x, p),
can be viewed as the buyer's virtual value function. Here λ(t ′ , t) is the Lagrangian dual variable for the IC constraint that says when the buyer has true type t ′ she does not want to misreport t.
Our Flow
Now we choose the dual variables λ carefully to induce a useful benchmark. In [7] and [9] , they cleverly choose the canonical flow in the revenue maximization setting. They divide the type space T into n regions R 1 , ..., R n by finding the largest value t i among all items (called "favorite" item). It is the item that contributes the most to the buyer's welfare. Then they let the flow go between two nodes t, t ′ ∈ R i only if they differs only on the i-th coordinate. However, the same flow does not give us a useful benchmark in our setting, as the way to divide the type space does not even depend on the information of the seller's costs (i.e. the realized cost c or the cost distribution C). In [7] , they also analyze another flow that is considered as a distribution of several canonical flows. We could define our flow similar to theirs: first for any fixed cost vector c ′ , divide the region by which item has the largest value t i − c ′ i and use the above flow. Next, define our flow as a distribution of the flow for c ′ , over the randomness of c ′ . This attempt does take the cost distribution into account. Unfortunately, the induced benchmark is very complex to analyze.
We introduce the following flow. For every i ∈ [n], define
EC'19 Session 2c: Mechanism Design I We route the flow in a similar manner, that is, there is a flow between two nodes t, t ′ ∈ R i if they only differ on the i-th coordinate. Here is the intuition behind our division. Inspired by the canonical flow, we again want to identify the favorite item for the buyer and divide the regions accordingly. However, the favorite item now should be defined as the one that contributes the most to the buyer's utility instead of the overall welfare. Note thatv
is exactly the expected utility from item i when the item price is c i , which is the lowest price that the seller is willing to sell the item. That is why we choosev i (t i ) to represent the contribution of item i to the buyer's utility. Interestingly, the permit-selling mechanisms are inspired by our flow, becausev i (t i ) can also be viewed as the "value" for the i-th permit. If we can design a mechanism to extract high revenue from selling the permits, then we have a mechanism that generates high profit. We will make this intuitive connection more concrete in Section 5.2. 
Define the flow as follows: Each node t receives flow of weight f (t) from the source. For every node
all flow entering node t goes to the sink ∅. Figure 2 shows an example of our flow when n = 2. The curve in the graph contains all (t 1 , t 2 ) such thatv 1 (t 1 ) =v 2 (t 2 ).
Since for all
With this property, we can use the following Lemma from Cai et al. [7] .
Lemma 4.5.
[7] There exists a flow λ such that for every t ∈ R i ,
whereφ k (·) is the Myerson's ironed virtual value function for t k . 5 In other words, t ′ i is the smallest value in the support set T i that is greater than t i .
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Proof of theorem 4.1: Let Φ (λ) (·) be the virtual value function induced by the above canonical flow λ. By Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.5,
The first inequality is due to Lemma 4.3, and the first equality is due to Lemma 4.5. The second inequality is because, for every t ∈ R i and c, since x is feasible, we have
Taking expectation over c, the RHS equals tov(t, [n]\{i}). Thus the inequality holds. We use Most-Surplus to denote the first term in the benchmark and Less-Surplus to denote the second term. 2
APPROXIMATING THE BENCHMARK
In this section, we bound the benchmark by the mechanisms described in Section 2.
Theorem 5.1. For any valuation distribution D, cost distribution C and any downward-closed feasibility constraint F , OPT Profit ≤ 2 · IS-Profit + 5 · PS-Profit + 4 · PB-Profit When the buyer's valuation is additive, OPT Profit ≤ IS-Profit + 3 · PS-Profit + 2 · PB-Profit Theorem 5.1 implies that a simple randomization among the three mechanisms achieves at least 1 11 the optimal profit for any downward-closed F . And for additive valuations, a randomization among the three mechanisms is a 6-approximation to the optimal profit.
Bounding Most-Surplus
To bound Most-Surplus, we will consider the Copies Setting from [11] , which is a single-dimensional setting in the revenue maximization problem. Here is a sketch of the proof. For any fixed cost vector c, we first focus on a related revenue maximization problem with a single buyer and multiple items, by simply subtracting the fixed cost c from the buyer's value t. Next, we show that the optimal revenue in the copies setting of the related revenue maximization problem is an upper bound of Most-Surplus. According to [11] , there exists a posted price mechanism in the multi-item setting whose revenue approximates the optimal revenue in its copies setting. Finally, we show a sell-items-separately mechanism whose expected profit is the same as to the expected revenue of the posted price mechanism.
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For any fixed c, we will first focus on the following revenue maximization problem with a single buyer and n items. Buyer has value t i − c i for each item i, where t i is drawn independently from D i . Since c is a fixed vector, the buyer's values are independent across items. The buyer is constraint-additive with respect to the feasibility constraint F .
The Copies Setting of the above problem is as follows: there are n buyers in the auction and n copies to sell. Buyer i only interests in the i-th copy and has value t i − c i for it, where t i is drawn independently from D i . Since c is a fixed vector, all buyers' values are also independent. The seller has no cost for the copies but has a downward-closed constraint F that specifies which copies can simultaneously be sold. Denote OPT-Rev Copies (c) the optimal revenue for the copies setting. Since it is a single dimensional setting, Myerson's auction achieves the optimal revenue, which equals to the maximum ironed virtual welfare
Moreover, let OPT-Rev Copies-UD (c) be the optimal revenue if we further restrict the seller to sell at most one copy. Similarly OPT-Rev Copies- Proof. We first prove the result for arbitrary downward-closed constraint F . Notice that for every t, the indicator
By [11] , there exists a posted price mechanism M(c) in the revenue maximization problem whose revenue is at least 1 2 OPT-Rev Copies-UD (c). Letp i (c) be the posted price for item i. Now we move back to our profit maximization setting and define the sell-items-separately mechanism M ′ as follows: For every cost vector c, define the posted price for item i asp i (c) + c i . Notice that for every t and c, the buyer in M ′ will purchase the same bundle B * (t, c) as the one in
When the buyer is additive, for any fixed c, it is not hard to realize that OPT-Rev Copies (c) equals to the revenue of selling each item separately using the monopoly reserve in the revenue maximization problem. Letp i (c) be the monopoly reserve for item i in the revenue maximization problem. Following the same proof as above, the sell-items-separately mechanism M ′ with pricê p i (c) + c i achieves expected profit at least
Bounding Less-Surplus
Before bounding Less-Surplus, we will first prove a crucial lemma of this section. Consider the revenue maximization problem with a single buyer and n items. The buyer's type t ∼ D. She has valuation functionv(t, ·) when her type is t. For simplicity, we will call this revenue maximization problem the revenue setting, and the original profit maximization problem the profit setting.
The following lemma converts any truthful mechanism in the revenue setting into an IC and IR mechanism in the profit setting, without changing the value of the objective (revenue and profit accordingly). The intuition behind the lemma is as follows. For any mechanism in the profit setting that sells the permit before revealing her true cost, the buyer with type t has expected "value" v(t, P), that is, how much the buyer can make from the second stage if given a set of permits P, for all set of permits P. Thus, the mechanism can be viewed as a corresponding mechanism in the revenue setting where the permits are being sold and the buyer has valuationv over the permits. Proof. For any t, let X (t) be the (possibly random) set of items that the buyer is allocated in mechanism M, when the buyer reports t. Let p(t) be the payment for the buyer in M. Define M ′ as follows: in the first stage, the buyer reports her type t and the seller gives the set of permits X (t) to the buyer and charge p(t). In the second stage, the seller reveals the cost vector c and the buyer can buy any item that she has a permit by paying item price c i . To prove M ′ is an IC and IR mechanism, it suffices to show that the buyer has no incentive to lie in the first stage. If the buyer with type t reports t ′ in M ′ , she will receive the set of permits X (t ′ ) and purchase her favorite bundle of items under item prices c. Her expected utility is
Here the expectation is taken over the randomness of X (t ′ ). Since M is truthful, for any t ∈
. It states that when the buyer has type t, reporting t in the first stage maximizes her expected utility. Thus M ′ is IC and IR. Notice that in the second stage of M ′ , the total item prices paid by the buyer is equal to the seller's total cost. Thus the seller's profit is exactly the payment in the first stage. Since M ′ use p(t) as the payment rule, the seller's profit of M ′ equals to the revenue of M. □ Now we are ready to bound the term Less-Surplus. Recall that
[n]\{i}) . 7 Recall that T + = T ∪ {∅} contains the choice of not attending the auction.
EC'19 Session 2c: Mechanism Design I
Consider the revenue setting where the buyer has valuation functionv and let OPT Rev (v) be the optimal revenue among all truthful mechanisms. Here we omit D and C in the notation as they are fixed. Given Lemma 5.3, it is tempting to find a simple mechanism that approximates OPT Rev (v) and convert it into a permit-selling mechanism. However, since we do not know what class of valuationv belongs to, it not a priori clear any simple vs. optimal result applies here. As the original valuation in the profit setting is constrained additive, it is natural to think thatv is also constrained additive. Unfortunately, we are not able to prove such a claim as there is no clear feasibility that is associated withv. The good news is that we are able to relax the class of valuations and show thatv is indeed a subadditive function, which allows us to leverage the result by Cai and Zhao [9] , Rubinstein and Weinberg [27] . Let us first review their results. They bound OPT Rev (v) whenv is subadditive over independent items (see Definition 5.4) . In both proofs, they separate the benchmark of the optimal revenue into two terms (called "single" and "non-favorite" in [9] ). They then bound the two terms by the optimal revenue of the Selling Separately mechanism(SRev(v)) and Bundling mechanism(BRev(v)) respectively. The second term "non-favorite" is defined as the expected welfare from all nonfavorite items. Here for any fixed t, the favorite item is defined as the i that maximizesv(t, {i}). Interestingly, this is how we divide the region into R i s and the term "non-favorite" is exactly the same as Less-Surplus. We will use Non-Fav Rev (v) to denote "non-favorite" here to emphasize that it is from the revenue setting.
In order to apply the result in the revenue setting, we first show that the functionv(·, ·) in Definition 2.1 is indeed subadditive over independent items.
Definition 5.4. [27] Suppose the buyer's type t is drawn from a product distribution D = i D i , her distribution V of valuation function v(t, ·) is subadditive over independent items if:
• v(·, ·) has no externalities, i.e., for each t ∈ T and S ⊆ [n], v(t, S) only depends on ⟨t i ⟩ i ∈S , formally, for any t ′ ∈ T such that t ′ i = t i for all i ∈ S, v(t ′ , S) = v(t, S). • v(·, ·) is monotone, i.e., for all t ∈ T and U ⊆ V ⊆ [n], v(t, U ) ≤ v(t, V ).
• v(·, ·) is subadditive, i.e., for all t ∈ T and U , 
Taking expectation over c on both sides, we havev(t, U ∪ V ) ≤v(t, U ) +v(t, V ). No externalities: fix any t ∈ T , S ⊆ [n] and any t ′ ∈ T such that t ′ i = t i for all i ∈ S. To provē v(t ′ , S) =v(t, S), it suffices to show that for any c, Thus a randomization between M ′ and the optimal sell-items-separately mechanism is a (9α + 2)approximation. □
COMPUTING THE SIMPLE MECHANISMS
In this section, we briefly discuss how to compute the simple mechanisms used in Section 5 in polynomial time. For the sell-items-separately mechanism, for every c, letp i (c) be the posted price of the mechanism constructed in [11] , which approximates OPT-Rev Copies-UD (c). According to Lemma 5.2, selling the items separately with pricep i (c) + c i when the seller's cost is c can achieves profit at least half of the Most-Surplus.
For the permit-selling mechanisms, we first point out that value oracle for the valuationv can be (approximately) implemented efficiently, given an algorithm for the following maximization problem over the feasibility constraint F : max S ∈ F i ∈S (t i − c i ), for every (t, c). Given t as an input, for every c the oracle uses the algorithm to obtain the favorite bundle and then calculates the expected utility. The computation of the oracle requires sampling from the cost distribution T S , but it's not hard to argue that a polynomial number of samples suffices. Besides, the conversion in Lemma 5.3 is also polynomial time, since the permit-selling mechanism follows the same allocation and payment rule in the first stage as the mechanism in the revenue setting. According to [9] , both the Selling Separately mechanism and Bundling mechanism used to bound Non-Fav Rev (v) can be computed efficiently given the value oracle forv. And the two mechanisms can be converted to the PS and PB mechanism accordingly in polynomial time.
A DUALITY FRAMEWORK
The seller aims to maximize her profit among all direct, IC, and IR mechanisms. This maximization problem can be captured by the following LP (see Figure 3 ). Here we use type ∅ to represent the choice of not participating in the mechanism. Now the IR constraint can be described as another BIC constraint that the buyer won't report type ∅. Let T + = T ∪ {∅}.
Variables:
• x i (t, c), for all t ∈ T , c ∈ T S , and i ∈ [n], denotes the probability that the buyer receives item i under profile (t, c). • p(t, c), for all t ∈ T and c ∈ T S , denoting the buyer's payment under profile (t, c). Constraints:
, for all t ∈ T , t ′ ∈ T + , guaranteeing that the mechanism is IC and IR. • x ∈ P(F ), guaranteeing the allocation is implementable. Objective:
• max E t,c [p(t, c) − c · x(t, c)], the expected seller's profit. We then take the partial Lagrangian dual of the LP in Figure 3 by lagrangifying the IC and IR constraints. Let λ(t, t ′ ) be the Lagrangian multiplier. The dual problem is described in Figure 4 .
• x i (t, c) and p(t, c).
• λ(t, t ′ ) for all t ∈ T , t ′ ∈ T + , the Lagrangian multiplier for the buyer's IC and IR constraints.
Constraints:
• λ(t, t ′ ) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ T , t ′ ∈ T + • x ∈ P(F ). Objective:
• min λ max x,p L(λ, x, p). 
